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STATE BORDERS ARE NEW BOUNDARIES
FOR SOVEREIGN IMMUNITYNEVADA V. HALL
In Nevada v. Hall, 1 a tort liability action, the United States Supreme
Court held that a California citizen could sue the State of Nevada without its
consent in a California court. With this holding, the Court tightened the
reins on the extraterritorial use of sovereign immunity as a defense. Now,
whether or not one state accords immunity to another state is a mere matter
of comity2 -it is not a constitutionally protected right.
A divided Court 4 upheld California's jurisdiction in the action, thereby
denying Nevada's claim of immunity. With this decision, the Court departed
from traditionally accepted notions of sovereign immunity. 5 Rather than an
unforeseeable change in the demarcation of states' rights, Nevada v. Hall
represents a reasonable culmination of various trends. Although case law has
consistently affirmed the principle of absolute immunity, 6 the doctrine recently has been limited, reflecting judicial unwillingness to shelter states
from liability and obligation. "
This Note supports the shift in attitude manifested by the Court's decision but criticizes the Court's failure to set forth adequate guidelines for
future application of its holding. The Note will analyze the Supreme Court's
decision in light of the previously held assumption that the defense of extraterritorial immunity was a constitutionally protected state's right. Further,
it will examine the Court's approval of California's refusal to apply Nevada's
statutorily imposed limitation on allowable recovery. Finally, the impact of
the decision will be discussed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The respondents in Nevada v. Hall were California residents who brought
a personal injury action in California against, inter alia, the State of Nevada

1. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
2. Conity of states is defined as "[s]imply a phrase designating the practice by which the
courts of one state follow the decision of another on a like question, though not bound by law of
precedents to do so." It is characterized by its voluntary nature; it is accorded as a matter of
deference and good will. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 334 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
3. 440 U.S. at 426.
4. This was a six to three decision, with two dissenting opinions. Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist joined in the dissent written by Justice Blackmun. Id. at 427-32. The Chief
Justice also joined in the dissent written by Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 432-43.
5. See notes 28-37 and accompanying text infra.
6. See notes 28-33 and accompanying text infra.
7. See notes 34-35 and accompanying text infra.
8. id.
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and the University of Nevada. 9 The injuries resulted from an automnobile
collision that occurred on a California highway involving respondents' car
and a car owned by the State of Nevada.1 0 On motion of the State of
Nevada, the trial court quashed the complaint and service of sumnons. 11
The California Court of Appeal Affirmed. 12
The California Supreme Court reversed, 1" stating that Nevada waived its
right to the defense of immunity by crossing the border into California and
that "state sovereignty ends at the state boundary."' 14 Further, the court
9. Hall v. University of Nev., 25 Cal. App. 3d 622, 102 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1972), rev'd, 8 Cal.
3d 522, 503 P.2d 1363, 105 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1972), cert. deied, 414 U.S. 820 (1973). The suit
originally was filed in San Francisco Superior Court. An action also was brought against the
administrator of the driver's estate. Plaintiff-respondents effected service of process on the nonresident motorist through the California long-arm statute, wbich provides as fbllows:
The acceptance by a nonresident of the rights and privileges conferred upon him by
this code or any operation bv himself or agent of a motor vehicle anywhere within
this state, or in the event the nonresident is the owner of a usotor vehicle then by
the operation of the vehicle anywhere within this state by any person with his
express or implied permission, is equivalent to an appointment by the nonresident
of the director or his successor in office to be his true and lawful attorney upon
whom may be served all lawful processes in any action or proceeding against the
nonresident operator or nonresident owner growing out of any accident or collision
resulting from the operation of any inotor vehicle anywhere within the state by
himself or agent, which appointment shall also be irrevocable and binding upon his
executor or administrator.
CAL. VEI. CODE § 17451 (West).
10. 440 U.S. at 441. The accident occurred in May, 1968, leaving one respondent, a minor,
severely retarded due to brain damage. His mother, also a respondent, suffered severe physical
and emotional injuries. The driver of the Nevada car was killed in the collision. Id.at 413 n.4.
At the trial, it was conceded that the car was State-owned, University-operated, and driven on
official business by an employee of the University. It also was conceded that the University is
ais instrumentality of the State of Nevada. Id. at 411.
It. 25 Cal. App. 3d 621, 102 Cal. Rptr. 67, 68 (1972). See note 9 supra.
12. Hall v. University of Nev., 25 Cal. App. 3d 621, 102 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1972). The California appellate court held that Nevada had not expressly consented to the suit by its own statutory waiver of insmmunity. See note 19 infra. The court refused to interpret the California
statute as encompassing implied consent to suit based on acceptance of service of process, stating that "[w]hile such an argument has a certain appeal to one's sense of logic, it begs the
fundamental question, i.e., whether one state may legislate away the sovereignty of a sister
state." The court concluded that sovereignty may be waived only where there exists a "clear
and unambiguous" statute of the state legislature. 25 Cal. App. 3d at 621, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
13. Hall v. University of Nev., 8 Cal. 3d 522, 503 P.2d 1363, 105 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1972),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820 (1973). The court relied entirely on the validity of the application of
the California long-arm statute to impose liability. See note 9 supra. The court concluded that:
[S]ister states who engage in activities within California are subject to our laws with
respect to those activities and are subject to suit in California courts with respect to
those activities. When the sister state enters into activities in this state, it is not
exercising sovereign power over the citizens of this state and is not entitled to the
benefits of the sovereign immunity doctrine as to those activities unless this state has
conferred immunity by law or as a matter of comity.
8 Cal. 3d at 524, 503 P.2d at 1364, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
14. Id. The court discussed decisions from other states in support of this proposition. See id.
at 524, 503 P.2d at 1365, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 357, where the court cited People v. Streeper, 12
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refused to grant immunity to Nevada on the basis of comity, 15 finding that
Califbrnia policies regarding compensation for tort victims outweigh the potential embarrassment to a sister state. 16 The decision was based solely on
California law and its finding was consistent with other California choice of
law decisions. 17
Nevada exhausted all avenues of review without success. 18 Immediately
prior to trial on remand, Nevada moved that the California court limit
9
lnoney damages to $25,000 per person, as required under Nevada Law.1

Ill. 2d 204, 212, 145 N.E.2d 625, 629 (1957), noting that the "sovereignty of one State does not
extend into the territory of another so as to create imlnunity from suit or freedom from judicial
interference." Hall v. University of Nev., 8 Cal. 3d at 524, 503 P.2d at 1365, 105 Cal. Rptr. at
357. Streeper involved an injunction proceeding against property owned by Missouri in Illinois.
The property was deemed to be owned as if by a private individual. The Hall court also relied
on State v. Holcomb, 85 Kan. 178, 116 P. 251 (1911), holding that property owned by Missouri
in Kansas was subject to taxation because in its capacity as a property owner, Missouri was to be
treated as any other private owner. Similarly, Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472 (1924),
held that Georgia had implicitly consented to be amenable to suit by acquiring and using Tennessee land. Accord, Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), where the Court held that
state operation of a railroad in interstate commerce subjected the suit to the Federal Employer's
Liability Act, and was amenable to suit in the federal courts. The Court concluded that the
commercial undertakings evidenced a waiver of sovereign immunity and constituted an implied
consent to suit. Although the Hall court relied on the above cases, it conceded that the cited
cases "involve enforcement of property duties rather than in personam jurisdiction and a transitory action." 8 Cal. 3d at 525, 503 P.2d at 1365, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
15. The court stated that "[flinally it must be pointed out that in a society such as ours,
which places such great value on the dignity of the individual and views the government as an
instrument to secure individual rights, the doctrine of sovereign immunity must be deemed
suspect." 8 Cal. 3d at 526, 503 P.2d at 1366, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 358 (emphasis added).
16. As support for this "balancing test", the court cited to Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352,
356-57 (1927), where the United States Supreme Court stated:
Motor vehicles are dangerous machines; and, even when skillfully and carefully operated, their use is attended by serious dangers to persons and property. In the
public interest the State may make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to
promote care on the part of all, residents and non-residents alike, who use its highwa\ys. The measure in question operates to require a non-resident to answer for his
conduct in the State where arise causes of action alleged against him, as well as to
provide for a claimant a convenient method by which he may sue to enforce his
rights. . . . [TIhe State may declare that the use of the highway by the non-resident
is the equivalent of the appointment of the registrar as agent on whom process may
be served.
8 Cal. 3d at 525, 503 P.2d at 1365, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 357. The California court also noted that
the Supreme Court of Nevada had applied the Hess holding in a Nevada case involving the
non-resident motorist statute of that state. See Kroll v. Nevada Indus. Corp., 65 Nev. 174, 191
P.2d 889 (1948).
17. Hall v. University of Nev., 8 Cal. 3d at 525-26, 503 P.2d at 1365-66, 105 Cal. Rptr. at
357-58. See also note 84 infra.
18. Nevada's petition for rehearing was denied. The petition for writ of certiorari also was
denied. University of Nev. v. Hall, 414 U.S. 820 (1973).
19. The legislation incorporating Nevada's waiver of immunity also limits Nevada's liability
in tort actions brought in its own courts. The relevant sections are 41.031 and 41.035(1). Section
41.031 provides:
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The trial court 20 denied this motion and, after a jury finding of negligence,
the superior court entered judgment on the verdict and awarded
damages in
22
the amount of $1,150,000.21 The court of appeal affirmed.
When the California Supreme Court denied review, 23 Nevada successfully
sought certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, 24 claiming violations of
25
article III, the eleventh amendment, and the full faith and credit clause.
In a six to three decision, 26 the Court upheld California's jurisdiction of the
action. 27
and action and
1.The State of Nevada hereby waives its immunity from liability
hereby consents to have its liability determined in accordance with the same rules of
law as are applied to civil actions against natural persons and corporations, except as
otherwise provided in NRS 41.032 to 41.038, inclusive, and subsection 3 of this
section, ifthe claimant complies with the limitations of NRS 41.032 to 41.036, inelusive, or the limitations of NRS 41.010. The State of Nevada fitrther waives the
immunity from liability and action of allpolitical
subdivisions of the state, and their
liability shall be determined in the same manner, except as otherwise provided in
NRS 41.032 to 41.038, inclusive, and subsection 3 of this section, ifthe claimant
complies with the litmitations of NRS 41.032 to 41.036, incltsive.
2. An action may be brought under this section, in a court of competent jurisdiction
of this state, against the State of Nevada, any agency of the state, or any political
subdivision of the state. In an action against the state or any' agency of the state, the
State of Nevada shall be named as defendant, and the summons and a copy of the
complaint shall be served upon the secretary of state.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.031 (1965).
Section 41.035(1) provides:.
1. No award for damages in an action sounding in tort brought under NRS 41.031
may exceed the sum of $25,000 to or for the benefit of any claimant. No such award
may include any amount as exemplary or punitive damages or as interest prior to
judgment.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.035(1) (1965).
20. Hall v. University of Nev., No. 433481, 470584-8 (Super. Ct., Alameda Co.), affd, 74
Cal. App. 3d 280, 141 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1977).
21. The trial court decision was reported in the decision of the California Court of Appeal in
Hall v. University of Nev., 74 Cal. App. 3d 280, 141 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1977).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 286, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
24. Nevada v. Hall, 436 U.S. 925 (1978).
25. Brief of Pet. for Cert., at 11-26.
26. See note 4 supra.
27. The response of the states was immediate. Nevada and 41 other states petitioned the
Court for rehearing. West Virginia and 40 states filed a brief requesting clarification of the
Court's decision stating that "[t]he court's newly announced doctrine could result in boundless
litigation against unconsenting states." On April 16, 1979, the Court denied the request.
Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, April 16, 1979, at 1, col. 2.
Indeed, legal scholars showed interest in the case even before the writ of certiorari was
granted. See generally Martiniak, Hall v. Nevada: State Court Jurisdictiott Over Sister States v.
American State Sovereign Immunity, 63 CAL-. L. REV. 1144 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Martiniak]; Note, Hall v. University of Nevada: Sovereign Immunity and the Transitory Actiou, 27
ARK. L. REV. 546 (1973); Note, Sovereign Immunity-May a State Assert In Personam Jurisdictiott over a Sister State Without Its Consettt? Hall v. University of Nevada, 53 B.U.L. REV. 736
(1973); Note, Sovereign Immunity-Sovereigtty of a State Does Not Extentd Into the Territory
of Another State so as to Create Immutntity From Suit Arisitg Out of the Sister State's Activities
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THE TRADITION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The significance of the Court's decisions is emphasized when viewed
against the historical backdrop of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. As the
majority noted, the doctrine is an amalgam of two different concepts: the
first involves immunity in one's own court and the second involves immunity
in the courts of another sovereign state. 28 Historically, however, the right
to sovereign immunity has been viewed as absolute in either case.
A fundamental postulate of the federalist system has been that a sovereign
may not be sued without its consent. 29 This doctrine of sovereign immunity
provides specifically that each state will respect the independence of every
other state and that the courts of one state may not sit in judgment on the
acts of another state done within the former state's territory. 30 The concept
has its roots in English feudal history and law that presumed the "King
could do no wrong.""a The doctrine became a part of American jurisprudence and flourished for two centuries. The United States Supreme Court
recognized this principle,32 noting that "lilt is an established principle of
jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in its
own courts, or in any other, without its consent and permission . . . ."
The scope of sovereign immunity has been narrowed in its extraterritorial
application. In interstate matters, a distinction has been nade between acts
of a private nature and acts of a public nature. 4 Some courts have held,
based on arguments of implied consent, that under certain circumstances a

Within the Boundaries of the Forum State-Hall v. University of Nevada, 6 LoY. L.A.L. REv.
585 (1973).
28. 440 U.S. at 414.
29. See, e.g., Ex Parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921) (state not amenable to suit without
consent in admiralty action); Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U.S. 32 (1918) (no constitutional right to sue a

state); Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (there can be no right 'against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends"); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436

(1900) (a state could not be sued without its consent by a corporation); Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1 (1890) (state not amenable to suit by its own citizen in federal court); Nathan v. Virginia,

1 U.S. (1 DalI.) 77 (1781) (Pennsylvania court ruled that a state could not be compelled to
appear in a sister state's court).

30. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
31. 99 S. Ct. at 1185 citing W. BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF EN-

GLAND 239 (1765). Blackstone argued that "whatever may be amiss in the conduct of public -affairs
is not chargeable personally on the king, nor is he, or his ministers accountable for it to the
people." This notion, however, implied that once a sovereign became aware of an injury in-

flicted through "misinformation or inadvertence", redress would follow. 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 241-44 (1765). See generally 1 F. POLLOCK, F.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1898).

32. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527 (1857).
33. Id. at 529.
34. See Martiniak, supra note 27, at 1155-57. This distinction is consistent with policy
changes in our dealings at the international level where we have begun to accord restrictive,
rather than absolute immunity. While this is a relatively recent shift in American policy, the
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state may waive its extraterritorial immunity when performing acts of a private nature. 35
But even these judicial alterations in the doctrine reflected an assumption
that sovereign immunity is a constitutionally protected right. 36 Article 111,
the eleventh amendment, and the full fhith and credit clause have been
credited with providing such an extraterritorial right. Prior to Nevada v.
Hall, the Court never probed this assumption because states generally had
been liberal in according one another comity. 37
Article III and the Eleventh AmendmentSpeculations on Historical Intentions
Article 11138 and the eleventh amendment 3 9 have been controversial
throughout the history of the United States. The interpretation of each has
theory of restrictive sovereign immunity was introduced in international law almost 100 years
ago. Mirabelli v. Winspear (1886), 38 Giur. Ital. 1 228 (Corte di Cassazione). The Mirabelli
court concluded that when a state engaged in activities such as commercial transactions, it did
so as a private individual, rather than as a sovereign. By the middle of the twentieth century,
international law no longer adopted the principle of absolute immunity. See Lauterpacht, The
Problem of Jurisdictional Imnmunities of Foreign States, 28 BurT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220 (1951). The
restrictive theory was espoused officially by the United States in 1952. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL.
984 (1952). Since then various federal courts have upheld jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign
based on this theory. See, e.g., Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, Ministry of
Commerce, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1966); Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d
354 (2d Cir. 1964); Premier Steamship Corp. v. Embassy of Algeria, 336 F. Supp. 507
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). See generally Note, The Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns, 63
YALE L.J. 1148 (1954); see also Engdahl, Inmunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1972); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:
Sovereign Inmunity, 77 H~aV. L. REV. 1 (1963); Note, Balancing The Vindication Of Constitutional Guarantees Against The Effective Functioning of Government: The Official Immunity
Scale Does Not Work-Butz v. Economou, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 143 (1978).
35. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal By., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (operation of a common carrier
by a state implies consent); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) (state susceptible to
suit in commercial venture). See note 14 supra for other examples of holdings consistent with
this approach.
36. In Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), the Court stated:
Recognition of the congressional power to render a State suable . ..does not mean
that the immunity doctrine, as embodied in the Eleventh Amendment with respect
to citizens of other States . .. is here being overridden. It remains the law that a
State may not be sued by an individual without its consent.
Id. at 192. See also note 29 supra.
37. The Court in Nevada v. Hall stated that '[i]n the past, this Court has presumed that the
States intended to adopt policies of broad comity towards one another. But this presumption
reflected an understanding of state policy, rather, than a constitutional command." 440 U.S. at
425.
38. U.S. CONST. art. III provides, in relevant part:
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish ...
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
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had impact on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Some early jurists believed article III was the constitutional source of sovereign immutnity,40
while others were convinced that it abrogated inmunity. 41 The popularity
of this latter view has eroded, however, and the prevailing view is that the
Framers did intend that the Constitution uphold immunity as it existed
under American common law. 42
Unfortunately, however, the nature of sovereign immIunity as it existed
prior to the Constitution is unclear. 4 3 During the constitutional debates, the
question of sovereign immunity was interwoven with the politics of ratification. The prospective states were alternately threatened with loss of their
sovereign powers by opponents of the Constitution 44 and reassured or reten-

which shall be made, under their Authority... to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States;
between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States,
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XI provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
40. Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269, 337-38 (1885) (Bradley, J., dissenting). See also
note 52 infra. More recently, Justice Marshall stated that "[t]he root of the constitutional impediment to the exercise of the federal judicial power .. .is not the Eleventh Amendment but
Art. III of our Constitution." Employees v. Missouri Pub. Health Dept., 411 U.S. 279, 291
(1973). This view was founded on a literal application of the language vesting the judiciary with
power in the controversies enumerated by the article.
41. See, e.g., Chisholn v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) in which the Court upheld a
suit against a state by a citizen of another state in a federal court. Two of the prominent debaters from the Virginia Convention who believed that article 111 abrogated sovereign immunity
played important roles in Chisholm; James Wilson authored one of the majority opinions and
Edmund Randolph was attorney, for the plaintiff. See note 47 infra. See also Field, The Eleventh
Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 531
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Field].
42. See Field, supra note 41, at 527. See also Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 324-25
(1934) (principality of Monaco not able to bring action against State of Mississippi in U.S. Supreme Court without the consent of Mississippi); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1890)
(eleventh amendment bars suits brought in federal courts against a state by one of its citizens); 1
C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 91, 96 (1922); Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment (A Case of the White Knight's Green Whiskers), 5
Hous. L. REV. 1, 7, 9 (1967).
43. There was much disagreement among the debaters involved in the process of constitutional ratification that was not settled at the time it was ratified. See Field, supra note 41, at
529, 530, 534. See also C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
27-40 (1972) [hereinafter cited as JACOBS]; Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create
Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth
Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1975).
44. Edmund Randolph, James Wilson, and Patrick Henry were prominent among those who
claimed that article III abrogated sovereign immunity. See generally 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

207, 318, 543 (1836) [hereinafter cited as

ELLIOT].
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tion of their powers by constitutional supporters. 45 It appears that when
the Constitution was adopted, there was no consensus regarding the status of
sovereign immtnity. 46
The position that article III abrogated states' immunity was reflected in
Chisholm v. Georgia. 4 7 In that case, the United States Supreme Court
held that the states may be sued in federal courts by citizens of other states.
Chishoin, however, was criticized for its literal interpretation of article III
and was overruled abruptly by the adoption of the eleventh amendment. 48
49
The ensuing case law fervently reinstated the pro-immunity position.
In the leading case of Hans v. Louisiana,5 0 the Court held that a state was
not amenable to citizen suits brought in federal courts. Hans thus affirmed
that sovereign immnttity, as a common law doctrine, had survived the ratification of article III. Additionally, Hans was regarded as implying a constitutional as well as a common law basis for immtunity. 51 While many courts
extended their interpretation of article III to incorporate such a constitutional guarantee of immunity, this position never was adequately supported
by historical sources. 52

45. The often quoted remarks of John Marshall, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton,
who were supporters of the Constitution, probably were made in response to the remarks made
by the opponents to it. For example, Hamilton stated:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent. This is the general sense, and the general practice of
mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty is now enjoyed
by the government of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the
States, and the danger intimated must be merely ideal. The circumstances which
are necessary to produce an alienation of State sovereignty were discussed in considering the article of taxation, and need not be repeated here.
THE FEDERALIsT No. 81, at 511 (Harv. U. Press, 1961) (emphasis in original). See 3 ELLIOT,
supra note 44, at 533, 555 for the remarks of James Madison and John Marshall.
46. See JACOBs, supra note 43, at 40. Jacobs draws this conclusion after a thorough discussion of the ratification proceedings as they involved the issue of immunity. Jacobs concluded
that "the legislative history of the Constitution hardly warrants the conclusion drawn by some
that there was a general understanding, at the time of ratification, that the states would retain
their sovereign immunity." Id.
47. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793). The Court upheld the propriety of federal jurisdiction over
an action brought by a South Carolina citizen against the state of Georgia for recovery of monies
owed on bonds on which Georgia had defaulted.
48. See note 39 supra. See also GOEBEL, J., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 734-41 (1971).
49. The pro-immunity position was represented by the Marshall-Madison view. See note 45
supra.
50. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Hans held that a citizen of Louisiana could not bring an action against
that state without the consent of the state. See note 29 supra.
51. This is probably because the Hans court quoted the remarks of Hamilton from the
FEDERALIST. See note 45 supra. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. at 13. See also Field, supra note
41, at 537.
52. For cases interpreting article IIIas incorporating a constitutional mandate, see, e.g.,
Employees v. Missouri Pub. Health Dept., 411 U.S. 279, 291 (Marshall, J., concurring) (gov-
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It was widely assumed that the eleventh amendment mandated absolute
sovereign immunity because it was passed to overturn Chisholm. 53 Until
Nevada v. Hall, no Justice of the United States Supreme Court disputed
this assumption. On the other hand, scholars recently have suggested
alternative interpretations of the amendment. One commentator
contended that the amendment upholds state immunity against federal suit
only on state causes of action. 54 It also has been suggested that the effect of
the amendment be restricted to actions it specifically enumerates. 5 Finally, the eleventh amendment has been read as repudiating the theory that
article III abrogated sovereign immunity, while restoring it as a "pre-existing
right of the State governments."' 56 The result in Nevada v. Hall is consistent with the latter view; sovereign immunity is neither abrogated nor required by the Constitution but exists as a time-honored, common law doctrine.
Full Faith and Credit-the Lawyer's Clause
The full faith and credit clause 5 7 has been referred to as the "lawyer's
clause of the Constitution." 58 The clause serves to orchestrate the various
erinent employees barred from suing a state in federal court); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S.
313, 323-25, 329-30 (1934) (Court had no jurisdiction to hear suit brought against a state by
foreign power); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 449 (1900) (federal corporation may not sue a
state without its consent).
It has been suggested that article III language was interpreted in a manner inconsistent with
the Framers' intentions. After an exhaustive study, it was concluded that at the time of the
framing, there was support for the belief that the article abrogated immunity, but there was also
some support for the position that it did not; sovereign immunity "did survive the Constitution,
but it survived as a common law requirement." Field, supra note 41, at 538.
53. See, e.g., Great N. Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 51 (1944), in which the Court said:
"A state's freedom from litigation was established as a constitutional right through the Eleventh
Amendment. The inherent nature of sovereignty prevents actions against a state by its own
citizens without its consent." (Emphasis added). See also Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dal. 378,
382 (1798), in which the Court said that "the amendment being constitutionally adopted, there
could not be exercised any jurisdiction, in any case, past or future, in which a state was stied
by the citizens of another state, or by citizens, or subjects, of any foreign state."
The issue of sovereign immunity as a defense has arisen predominantly in federal court actions where the above-mentioned reliance on the eleventh amendment prevailed. When the
issue might have arisen in state courts, the constitutional question was evaded by courts' reliance on a finding of implied consent or waiver of immunity based on the nature of the undertaking. See notes 34, 35, and accompanying text supra.
54. Cullison, supra note 42, at 21.
55. See JACOBS, supra note 43, at 162-63. Accord, McCormack, Intergovernmental Ininunity and the Eleventh Amiendment, 51 N.C.L. REV. 485, 504-07 (1973). See note 39 supra.
56. Field, supra note 41, at 538-39.
57. U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 1, the full faith and credit clause, provides: "Full Faith and
Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of
every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such
Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."
58. See Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45
COLUsi. L. REV. 1, 2 (1945) [hereinafter cited as Jackson]. Justice Cardozo noted that the full
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independent legal systems of the United States and to unify nationally all
judicially established rights.59 Thus, tile mandates of the clause are important in tile analysis of sovereign immunity.
The Supreme Court, dealing with the clause for the first time in 1813,
held that a judgment that is conclusive in the state in which it was rendered
must be upheld as valid elsewhere. 6 While this position is still consistent
with the current view, it is subject to various qualifications. For example, a
judgment may not be accorded full faith and credit if tile original court
lacked jurisdiction. 6' In addition, criteria used for tile enforcement of
foreign judgments are usually more stringent than criteria applied to recognition of foreign laws. Some courts have held, for example, that the clause
does not require one state to apply tile laws of another state in contravention

of its own legislation or policies.

2

As states substitute legislation for common law, greater difficulty arises
regarding tile recognition of foreign statutes. In a multistate occurrence
where each state may claim tile right to govern, a choice of law problem
arises. 63 Generally, the forum is free to apply its own law, but thiS is confaith and credit clause involves a constitutional element of "one of the most baffling subjects of
legal science, the so-called Conflict of Law." B. CARiDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE
67 (1928).
59. See Jackson, supra note 58, at 2.
60. Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813) (action of debt upon a judgment of the
Supreme Court of New York brought in the courts of another state).
61. See, e.g., A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 213-14 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as EHRENZWEIG], noting that because of increased uniformity of jurisdictional
standards, it is not common for the full faith and credit problem to arise in a jurisdictional
context. But see Welch v. Downs, 1 Ill.
App. 2d 424, 118 N.E.2d 51 (1954) (Ohio award not
honored in Illinois due to insufficiency of service per Illinois standards); American Cas. Co. v.
Kincade, 219 Miss. 653, 69 So. 2d 820 (1954) (Wisconsin judgment denied full faith and credit
even though it was in accord with Wisconsin standards forjurisdiction).
The courts have distinguished also between denial of a right and denial of a remedy and have
held that full faith and credit is not required to be given to a foreign remedy. See, e.g., Tennessee Coal, Iron & RB. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 360 (1911) (denied the application of the full
faith and credit clause to an exclusionary statute in an injury suit). See generally EHRENZ\VEIG,
supra, at 143-44.
62. See, e.g., Pacific Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939), discussed in notes 63 and 106 infra. See also Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comin l, 294
U.S. 532, 548 (1935), in which the Court applied the following limitation on the full faith and
credit clause: "It follows that not every statute of another state will override a conflicting statute
of the forum by virtue of the full faith and credit clause."
63. In such an instance a "true conflict" may occur. A "true conflict" has been defined as
occurring when "[e]ach state has a policy, expressed in its law, and each state has a legitimate
interest, because of its relationship to one of the parties, in applying its law and policy to the
determination of the case." Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws
Method, 25 U. Cm. L. REV. 227, 252 (1958).
Choice of law problems have been especially perplexing in certain areas: domestic relations,
liability insurance, wrongful death actions, taxation, statutes of limitation, and workmen's compensation. See, e.g., Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) (constitutionality of "direct action" statute) discussed in notes 65-66 and accompanying text infra;
Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951) (Wisconsin courts were bound by clause to honor Illinois
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ditioned upon a consideration of state interests. 64 In Watson v. Employers
Liability Assurance Corp.,65 the Supreme Court noted that in interstate
transactions each state may have an interest in enforcing its own policies. In
Watson, the Court held that the full faith and credit clause did not require
Louisiana to subordinate its own policy in favor of Massachusetts' policy because the interests of Massachusetts did not outweigh those of Louisiana, the
forum state. 66 Many cases have affirmed this resulting limitation on the
extraterritorial effect of state legislation and policy. 67 The basis for the limitation is the evaluated quality of the forum state's interest in maintaining the
action in its courts. 68
Subject to certain exceptions, once an award is reduced to a judgment it is

entitled to full recognition in the courts of a sister state. 69 If' recognition is
refused, an asserted federal right is denied, and this denial can be grounds
for review by the United States Supreme Court.

70

wrongful death statute fira death which occurred in Illinois); Order of Travelers v. Wolfe, 331
U.S. 586 (1947) (action brought by Ohio resident against an Ohio fraternal society in the courts
of South Dakota); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (Nevada divorce upheld in
North Carolina); Pacific Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939)
(Massachusetts employee injured in California brought an action against the Massachusetts
employer in the California courts) discussed in note 106 infra; Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104
U.S. 592 (1881) (debt of one state not exempt from taxation in another state).
Moreover, it would appear that a "true conflict" would arise when a state asserts a special
interest because, as in Nevada v. Hall, the state itself is a defendant. The resolution of the
California choice of law problem is discussed at note 84 infra.
64. The Supreme Court in Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. at
547-48 stated:
Prima facie every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its own statutes,
lawfully enacted. One who challenges that right, because of the force given to a
conflicting statute of another state by the full faith and credit clause, assumes the
burden of showing, upon some rational basis, that of the conflicting interests involved those of the foreign state are superior to those of the forum.
See generally Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law Versus Choice-of-Law Rules: Judicial Method in
Conflicts-Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. REV. 975, 980 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Sedler] in which it
was noted that whenever courts conclude that they have a real interest in applying their own
laws, in order to implement their own policies, they usually applied their own law. In effect, the
courts have been applying the interest analysis approach. See note 84 infra for discussion of
interest analvsis.
65. 348 U.S. 66 (1954). Watson involved the constitutionality of a "direct action" statute in
an action brought against an insurance company.
66. Id. at 73.
67. See generally Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S.
408 (1955); Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
68. See note 64 supra.
69. See EuRENZVEIG, supra note 61, at 195, noting that "[t]here is of course no doubt that
sister state awards reduced to judgment are entitled to recognition."
70. See, e.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 443 (1943), in which the
Court stated that "[wihen a state court refuses credit to the judgment of a sister state, an
asserted federal right is denied and the sufficiency of the grounds of denial are for this Court to
decide." (Texas compensation award barred further recovery for same injury in Louisiana court).
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Thus, there have been various factors affecting the tradition of sovereign
immunity. It was within this historical context that the Court decided

Nevada v. Hall.
THE NEVADA V. HALL DECISION

In this case of first impression, the United States Supreme Court held that
although a sovereign may not be stied in its own courts without its consent,
the sovereign may not be immune from suit in the courts of another
sovereign. 71 In explanation, the Nevada v. Hall Court said that the Constitution neither implicitly nor explicitly provides for the protection of a
state's extraterritorial immunity fiom suit. 72 Further, the Court concluded
that the full faith and credit clause did not require California to apply
Nevada law in abrogation of its own taw, 7' holding that states may, if they so
choose, accord one another immunity or respect one another's laws, but
there is no constitutional imperative to do so.74
Before it could evaluate the propriety of California's claimed jurisdiction of
the action, the Court first had to resolve the constitutional question raised
by Nevada's assertion of a protected right of immunity. 75 The resolution of
this question is the essence of the opinion. The Court addressed four major
areas in its consideration of this question: (1) the source and scope of
sovereign immunity; (2) the status of the doctrine at the time of the framing
of the Constitution; (3) whether the full faith and credit clause mandates that
California apply Nevada law; and (4) whether other constitutional provisions
imply a guarantee of extraterritorial immunity.
Source and Scope of Sovereign Immunity
The Court acknowledged that there was an historical absolute right of
sovereign immunity friom suit without consent in one's own court 76 but distinguished that situation from Nevada's claimed right to immunity in the
courts of another state. 77 As the early Colonists had done, the Court rejected as "fiction" the notion of the infallibility of the sovereign 78 and ob-

71. 440 U.S. at 414-18.

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 425.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 426.
Nevada invoked the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3). The

relevant section concerns the validity of a statute or treaty, the constitutionality of a state stat-

ute, or "where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the
Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised under the United
States." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Nevada v. Hall, 436 U.S. 925 (1978).

76. See notes 28-39 and accompanying text supra.
77. See 440 U.S. at 414, where the Court stated that "[tihe doctrine of sovereign immunity

is an amalgam of two quite different concepts, one applicable to suits in the sovereign's own
courts and the other to suits in the courts of another sovereign."
78. Id. But see note 31 supra and JACOBS, supra note 43, at 7.
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served that to apply the doctrine in a foreign sovereign's courts would subordinate the authority of that sovereign. 79 Only an agreement between the
two sovereigns, or the voluntary decision of the second to accord immunity
to the first, would avoid this result.
As support for this proposition, the Court cited the 1812 case of Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon 80 in which a Napoleonic ship, while moored in an
American harbor, was the subject of a claim of ownership by American citizens. Schooner affirmed the exclusivity of a nation's jurisdiction within its
own territory. 81 The immunity of the foreign sovereign was upheld because
the source of that immunity was found in American law, under which
America waived its exclusive right of territorial jurisdiction over visiting
sovereigns. 82 The Court in Nevada v. Hall noted that Nevada's defense of
sovereign immunity probably would have been sustained at the time of the
Schooner decision. 83 Nonetheless, after a sweeping conclusion that the
propriety of Nevada's claim rested solely with California law, 84 the Court
79. Id. at 416. The Court reasoned that "[s]uch a claim necessarily implicates the power and
authority of a second sovereign; its source must be found either in an agreement, express or
implied, between two sovereigns, or in the voluntary decision of the second to respect the
dignity of the first as a matter of comity." Id.
80. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
81. The Nevada v. Hall Court quoted Schooner:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and
absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. . . . All exceptions,
therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories,
must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other
legitimate source.
440 U.S. at 416, quoting Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
82. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. at 136-37.
83. 440 U.S. at 417. The Court's reliance on Schooner is confusing, however, since that case
involved two wholly independent, foreign nations, rather than two states joined by the potent
agreement of the Union, the Constitution.
84. 440 U.S. at 417. There was no dispute as to the correctness of the California court's
interpretation of California law. The approach taken by that court is consistent with its other
recent decisions regarding choice of law problems in the torts area. For example, in a 1967
wrongful death action, the California Supreme Court concluded that the traditional approach,
namely the "place of the wrong" rule, was not necessarily the approach of choice in all torts
cases; the various interests involved in the multistate dispute required evaluation. Reich v.
Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967). Accord, Hurtado v. Superior
Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974).
This "governmental interest" approach was subjected to a re-examination by various scholars.
The California court applied the evolved "comparative impairment" approach in Bernhard v.
Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976). Applying this approach,
a court determines which state's interest would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of the other state involved. The law is applied from the state which would
be most impaired. In Bernhard, a Nevada tavern-owner was held liable, beyond the limits of a
Nevada statute, for injuries to a California resident. The injuries resulted from a car accident
between the plaintiff and an intoxicated person who had been served alcohol by the Nevada
tavern-owner. The California court applied California law since such liability should have been a
foreseeable and coverable business expense for the Nevada tavernkeeper, who actively solicited California patrons.
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stated that California had demonstrated that it was no longer willing to sustain the sovereign immunity defense in an action such as the instant one. 85
The Court recognized that the California approach was in keeping with
the recent trend away from aflording absolute immunity in international disputes. 86 Many nations have chosen to accord restrictive rather than abso-

lute immunity to other nations. s7

The Court also observed that states have

begun to waive immunity in their own courts. "

It noted that these choices

reflect an increased emphasis on the right to redress for individuals and,
therefore, should have made the change in extraterritorial immunity foreseeable.

89

Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that California was free to apply its
own law and to refuse immunity to Nevada unless, as Nevada argued,
California was precluded fiom so doing by a federal rule implicit in the
Constitution. 9"

The Court, therefore, examined the status of the doctrine of

sovereign immunity at the time of the framing of the Constitution in order to
ascertain whether or not such a federal rule existed. 9
In Hall v. University of Nev., 8 Cal. 3d 522, 503 P.2d 1363, 105 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1973), the
California Court of Appeal discussed Bernhard with approval and noted California's obligation as
parens patrie. The California court also noted that as in Bernhard, tort liability resulting from
an accident should have been foreseeable to Nevada. Applying the comparative impairment
analysis, the court concluded that California law should be applied. See Kanowitz, Comparative
lmpairment and Better Law: Grand Illusions in the Conflict of Laws, 30 HASTINGS L.J., 255,
283-86 (1978). See generally B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS
(1963); Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1963); Horowitz,
The Law of Choice of Law in California-A Restatement, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 719 (1974);
Sedler, supra note 64; Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An
Analysis and a Refoirmnulation, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 181 (1977).
85. See 440 U.S. at 417-18, where the Court observed that -[b]y rejecting the defense in this
very case, however, the California courts have told us that whatever California law may have
been in the past, it no longer extends immunity to Nevada as a matter of comity." The Court's
conclusion presupposed, however, that extraterritorial immunity is not constitutionally guaranteed; this conclusion was not made clearly by the Court until later in the opinion. Id. at 426.

86. Id. at 417 n.13.
87, See generally Note, The Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns, 63 YALE L.J.
1148 (1954). See also note 34 supra.
88. 440 U.S. at 417 n.13.
89. Id. The Court stated that "as States have begun to waive their rights to immunity in
their own courts, it was only to be expected that the privilege of immunity afforded to other
States as a matter of comity would be subject to question." Id. (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 418.
91. In regard to the modern treatment of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the Court did
not discuss fully the only appellate case similar to the instant one. The majority did mention the
case, Paulus v. South Dakota, 58 N.D. 643, 227 N.W. 52 (1929), but did so only in a footnote.
440 U.S. at 417 n.13. The Paulus case, a decision of the Supreme Court of North Dakota, held
that a state, absent consent, could not be sued in the courts of a sister state by a citizen of the
forum state. Paulus involved an action against the State of South Dakota brought by a North
Dakota resident who was injured in a coal mine operated by South Dakota in North Dakota.
Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, stated that "the only authority that has been cited to us or that
we have found is directly opposed to the Court's conclusion." Id. at 432 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Status of Sovereign Immunity when the
Constitution tvas Framed
The Court acknowledged that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was significant in the infancy of the nation. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that
the suabilitv of one state by another was "apparently not a matter of concern
when the new Constitution was being drafted and ratified. '"92 While conceding that the scope of immunity was included in discussions relating to
article 11I, 9 3 the Court speculated that the omission of an appropriate,
specific provision was due to the Framers' presumption that comity, as it
prevailed then, would go unaltered.94
It was noted that the eleventh amendment 95 was passed to address the
immunity issue 96 and that the language of the ensuing cases reflected the
widely held belief that a state was never amenable to suit without its consent. 97 Yet, the Court distinguished these cases, as well as the ratification
debates, on the ground that they involved questions of federal rather than
state court jurisdiction. 98
The Court found this distinction important because these decisions involved the extent to which states had authorized suits against themselves in
federal courts by their ratification of the Constitution. These decisions did
not resolve, however, the question of whether the constitution limited the
power of one state to assert jurisdiction over another state. 99
The Court interpreted the eleventh amendment not as a grant of immunity but solely as a limitation on the power of the federal judiciary to intervene in the actions enumerated in the amendment. 100 The Court in
Nevada v. Hall then summarily concluded that neither article III nor the
eleventh amendment provide any basis to justify interference with California's exercise of power. 101
Mandates of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
The Court also considered Nevada's claim that the full faith and credit
clause 10 2 required California to honor Nevada's consent to suit in Nevada

92. Id. at 418. See notes 40-48 and accompanying text supra.

93. See note 38 supra.
94. 440 U.S. at 419.

95. See note 39 supra.
96. 440 U.S. at 420.
97. Id. See notes 49-53 and accompanying text supra.
98. 440 U.S. at 420-21.
99. Id. at 421.
100. Id. at 420. The Court stated conclusively that the "[a]mendment places explicit limits on
the powers of the federal courts to entertain suits against a State." Id. The Court also noted that
"even as so limited," the eleventh amendment does not provide the states with absolute immunity in federal court actions. Id. at n.19.
101. Id. at 421.
102. See note 57 supra.
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courts only. 13 Nevada further argued that if its waiver of sovereign immunity in Nevada courts were interpreted to include consent to suit in
California courts, then the full faith and credit clause required California to
honor Nevada's statutorily imposed limitation on recovery. 104
The Court stated that the full faith and credit clause does require recognition of the official acts and statutes of sister states. 105 The Court also held,
however, that the clause does not require that legislation of a foreign state
be applied in abrogation of the law of the forum state, noting that the clause
does not mandate extraterritorial effect for statutes. 106
Evaluating California's policy interests, the Nevada v. Hall Court noted
that various provisions in California legislation reflect a policy of full compensation for tort victims. 107 Additionally, the Court noted that California
had unconditionally waived its immunity in tort actions, regardless of the
identity of the tortfeasor. Having concluded that the California policy was as
deserving of' affirmation as the Nevada policy, the Court upheld California's
sovereign right to legislate for its own citizens. 108
Ramifications of Other Constitutional Provisions

Finally, the Court reviewed Nevada's contention that a mandate for each
state to accord sovereignty to sister states is implicit in the Constitution. 10 9

Nevada claimed that states "are not free to [treat] each other as unfriendly
sovereigns."110 Nevada supported this claim by citing article I, section
8,111 which declares states are not free to levy discriminatory taxes on goods
of other states, nor to bar their entry altogether. Nevada further supported
this claim on the basis of article IV, section 2, 112 which mandates extradi103. 440 U.S. at 421.

104. Id. See note 19 supra.
105. 440 U.S. at 421. See notes 62 & 67 supra.

106. For this proposition, the Court cited Pacific Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
306 U.S. 493 (1939), which held that the clause did not require California to apply Massachusetts law in contravention of its own policy. The case involved a Workmen's Compensation
claim of a Massachusetts employee injured in California in the course of his employment by a
Massachusetts employer. The Pacific court said the "[flull faith and credit does not here enable

one state to legislate for the other or to project its laws across state lines so as to preclude the
other from prescribing for itself the legal consequences of acts within it." 306 U.S. at 504-05.

107. 440 U.S. at 424. The Court also noted that California has unequivocally waived its own
immunity from liability for torts. Id.
108. Id. at 426. The Court said:

In this Nation each sovereign governs only with the consent of the governed. The
people of Nevada have consented to a system in which their State is subject only to
limited liability in tort. But the people of California, who have had no voice in
Nevada's decision, have adopted a different system. Each of these decisions is
equally entitled to our respect.
Id. (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 424. See also Brief for Petitioner at 12.
110. Id. See also Brief for Petitioner at 15.
111. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
112. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. I & 2.
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tion of fugitives from other states, and on the basis of the privileges and
immunities clause.
The Court reasoned that while each of these constitutional provisions
places a specific limitation on the sovereignty of the states, nonetheless they
do not imply that according sovereign immunity is "anything other than a
matter of comity." 1 13 It was further observed that, given the tenth amendment's 114 reservation of powers to the states and people, caution was necessary before concluding that the Framers intended any unstated limitations
1 15
on state power.
While conceding that broad policies of comity between states had been
presumed historically, the Court emphasized that this reflected policy rather
than a constitutional mandate. 116 Itcited Bank of Augusta v. Earle117 for
the proposition that a state merely needs to "declare its will" in order to
restrict the presumed comity between states. 118 In Nevada v. Hall the
Court held that "California had 'declared its will' " by adopting a policy of full
compensation for tort victims. 119 The Court reasoned that if it were to
overturn California's right to legislate for its own citizens, based solely on
"inference from the structure of our Constitution and nothing else," the decision would result in an impermissible intrusion on the sovereignty of
California. 120
CRITICISM

In its majority opinion, the Court correctly concluded that extraterritorial
immunity is not a constitutionally protected state's right. The resulting limi113. 440 U.S. at 425. The Court in Nevada v. Hall stated:
Each of these provisions places a specific limitation on the sovereignty of the several
States. Collectively they demonstrate that ours is not a union of 50 wholly independent sovereigns. But these provisions do not imply that any one State's immunity
from suit in the courts of another State is anything other than a matter of comity.
Id. at 425.
114. U.S. CONST. amend. X provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people."
115. 440 U.S. at 425.
116. Id.
117. 38 U.S. (13 Peters) 519 (1839). This case involved an action brought by a Georgia bank
against an Alabama resident for non-payment of bills of exchange.
118. The Nevada Court stated:
The intimate union of these states, as members of the same great political family;
the deep and vital interests which bind them so closely together; should lead us, in
the absence of proof to the contrary, to presume a greater degree of comity, and
friendship, and kindness towards one another, than we should be authorized to
presume between foreign nations. And when (as without doubt must occasionally
happen) the interest or policy of any state requires it to restrict the rule, it has but
to declare its will, and the legal presumption is at once at an end.
440 U.S. at 425-26, quoting Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Peters) 519, 590 (1839).
119. 440 U.S. at 426.
120. Id.The Court stated that "[n]othing in the Federal Constitution authorizes or obligates
this Court to frustrate that policy out of enforced respect for the sovereignty of Nevada." Id.
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tation o the use of the defense of immunity at the interstate level was
compared with the similar trend at the federal and international levels. The
Court did not, however, set forth adequate guidelines for future courts to
follow, nor did it thoroughly discuss all of the issues addressed.
While the Court's historical analysis was arguably correct, it was supported 1by only a brief discussion. The majority reasoned that extraterritorial
immunity was not provided by the Framers due to their assumption that the
prevailing policy of comity would remain unaltered. 121 As some commentators have suggested, however, it may be equally reasonable to conclude
that the Framers presumed that sovereign immunity would go unaltered. 122
Support for this contention lies in the fact that at the time of the framing
of the Constitution, states had little reason to fear suits by other states; 123
their major concern was preventing foreign and federal intrusions on their
sovereign powers. 124 It is reasonable to maintain that the states did not
insure against suits by other states because they did not foresee tile
technological advances which resulted in a mobile society with concomitantly
complex interstate commerce.
In regard to the Court's narrow interpretation of' tile eleventh amendment,125 the dissent asserted that the majority's view was too literal.126
Moreover, the majority supported its departure fiom case precedent and
prior interpretation by a discussion that is cursory, in light of the wealth of
commentary available regarding the eleventh amendment. 127
The major contention of the dissenting opinions was that there should be a
finding of' an implied constitutional guarantee of extraterritorial immunity.
Justice Rehnquist urged that such imlmunity is an inherent part of the "constitutional plan" and construed the majority's opinion as working a "fundamental readjustment" to it. 128 Justice Blackunn cited other instances
where the Court inferred a provision from the Constitution, rather than rely

121. See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
122. See Field, supra note 41; JACOBS, supra note 43.
123. In response to the majority's contention that extraterritorial immunity was "apparently
not a matter of concern" for the Framers, Justice Blackmun asserted flatly: "The only reason
why this
immunity did not receive specific mention is that it was too obvious to deserve mention."
440 U.S. at 431 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
124. The Paulus court emphasized this and noted that the states were immune from suit in
the federal courts because of the eleventh amendment. The court explained it would be much
less "consistent with any sound conception of sovereignty that a state might be haled into the
courts of a sister sovereign state at the will or behest of citizens or residents of the latter."
Paulus v. South Dakota, 58 N.D. at 649, 227 N.W. at 55.
125. See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
126. 440 U.S. at 434 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
127. See notes 49-63 and accompanying text supra.
128. 440 U.S. at 432 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist cited to McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) and National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976) for the proposition that the Court
has often relied on notions of a constitutional plan-the implicit ordering of relationships within the federal system necessary to make the Constitution a workable
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on a literal interpretation

of it. 129 The dissenting opinions emphasized the
historical consistency with which the Court has upheld sovereign immunity.
They also stressed the Court's traditional unwillingness to disturb the

federalist system. 130
While it should be conceded that extraterritorial immunity is not expressly
provided for, there is certain appeal in finding it implied in the Constitution.
This would preserve 200 years of precedent. If the Court had found immunity to be implicitly guaranteed, it still could have found that Nevada had
waived its right based on implied consent because its actions in California
were not sovereign in nature. 131 Such a holding, however, would have
created other problems. For example, the nature of the activities that would
result in "implied consent" would have to be determined on a case by case
basis. Such determinations would leave states in a position of uncertainty
every time they crossed their own borders. The Court was correct, therefore, in making a direct and conclusive analysis of the constitutional source
for sovereign immunity.
The majority appropriately looked to the current needs of the country,
instead of following outdated rationales, in holding that a state may be held
full\, accountable for its torts outside its own borders. The Court noted with
approval the trend in international and federal cases 132 reflecting a limitation
on the use of sovereign immunity as a defense. This important observation,
governing charter and to give each provision within that document the full effect
intended by the Framers. The tacit postulates yielded by that ordering are as much
engrained in the fabric of the document as its express provisions, because without
them the Constitution is denied force and often meaning.
1d. at 433 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
129. Justice Blackmun referred to the instances when the Court implied a guarantee of freedom of association in the.first amendment, and also to the cases in which the Court implied a right
of interstate travel. He contended that the same approach should be taken in regard to a constitutional implication of interstate sovereign immunity. He stated that he "would find that
source not in an express provision of the Constitution but in a guaranty that is implied as an
essential component of federalism." Id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See note 128 supra.
131. It is interesting to note that throughout the lower California court decisions, California
appears to have reserved the "implied consent" argument as an alternative. It even appeared as
an argument in the Respondent's Brief for the writ of certiorari. Brief of Respondent at 9-10,
Nevada v. Hall, 436 U.S. 925 (1978).
The California Court of Appeal stated that "[t]he Supreme Court [of California] did not hold
that Nevada had waived sovereign immunity or had given its implied consent to be sued ill
California. It held simply that Nevada's sovereign protection does not extend beyond its own
borders." Hall v. University of Nev., 74 Cal. App. 3d at 284, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 440. However,
a review of the context in which the California Supreme Court concluded that "state sovereignty
ends at the state boundary" suggests that the question was not so closed-ended as interpreted
on remand. When the court made that statement, it supported it with discussion of cases dealing with states' waiver of immunity based on the nature of their activities in the foreign states.
Hall v. University of Nev., 8 Cal. 3d at 524-25, 503 P.2d at 1365, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 356-57
(1972). See note 14 and accompanying text supra. See also note 35 and accompanying text
supra.
132. 440 U.S. at 417-18 n.13.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:191

however, was relegated to a footnote. 133 It would have been preferable for
the Court to have included a discussion of why restrictive rather than absolute immunity134 is preferable in interstate transactions. In the same footnote the Court observed that states have begun to waive immunity in their

own courts. 135 Indeed, the majority noted that these trends should have
made the outcome in Nevada v. Hall foreseeable. 136 Thus, the Court
should have addressed these policy considerations in the text of its decision.
A more direct statement was needed that states cannot expect to be shielded
from liability for their tot'tious acts and that an individual's right to redress is
paramount.
Although the majority's decision involved these broad considerations, the
court attempted to limit its holding to the circumstances of the instant case,
i.e., traffic accidents occurring outside the borders of the defendant
state. 137 The majority did so inadequately, 1 38 however, by once again relegating salient material to a footnote. 139 It provided no explanation to justify limiting its holding to traffic accidents. 140 Therefore, despite its proper
ruling, the Court's failure to delineate the intended scope of its holding may
effectuate the chaos feared by the dissent.1 4 ' The resulting uncertainty for

133. Id.
134. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
135. 440 U.S. at 417-18 n.13.

136. See note 89 supra.
137. The Nevada v. Hall Court stated:
California's exercise of jurisdiction in this case poses no substantial threat to our
constitutional system of cooperative federalism. Suits involving traffic accidents occurring outside of Nevada could hardly interfere with Nevada's capacity to fulfill its
own sovereign responsibilities. We have no occasion, in this case, to consider
whether different state policies, either of California or of Nevada, might require a
diflerent analysis or a diflerent result.
440 U.S. at 424 n.24.
138. Justice Blackinun called the attempt "a fragile footnote disclaimer" and noted that although the Court "purports to confine its holding....[s]iuch facts, however, play absolutely no
part in the reasoning by which the Court reaches its conclusion." Id. at 429 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
139. Id.at 424 n.24. See note 137 supra. Justice Rehnquist stated:
I join my Brother BLACKMUN's doubts about footnote 24 of the majority opinion.
Where will the Court find its principles of "cooperative federalism?". . . Having
shunned the obvious, the Court is truly adrift on unchartered waters; the ultimate
balance struck in the name of "cooperative federalism" can be only a series of unsatisfactory bailing operations in fact.
Id. at 442-43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
140. Justice Blackmun observed that "[t]here is no suggestion in this language that, if
California had adopted some other policy in some other area of the law, the result would be any
different." Id. at 429 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
141. Justice Blackmun asserted that
the Court's basic and undeniable ruling is that what we have always thought of as a
"sovereign State" is now to be treated in the courts of a sister State, once jurisdic-

tion is obtained, just as any other litigant. I fear the ultimate consequences of that
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the states may be no less than had the fiction of implied consent been
employed. 142
IMPACT OF THE DECISION

The breadth of the Court's decision will adversely affect uniformity of law
and will give rise to problems regarding the enforcement of judgments. Future courts will have difficulty applying the holding of Nevada v. Hall because the Court failed to delineate adequately the intended scope of its decision. 143 As a result, in an effort to avoid suit in a sister state's court, states
may enact laws outlining their positions on comity. In addition, states may
refuse to interact with other states that do not accord them reciprocal immunity. As the dissent noted, this may result in "Balkanization." 144 States
may hastily withdraw all of their seizable assets from sister states in an attempt to avoid foreign judgments.
The holding may also lead to forum-shopping. Since there is no uniform
system of immunity, plaintiffs wishing to bring an action against a state may
bring suit where the law of a particular state appears most favorable to their
positions. Furthermore, as Justice Rehnquist observed, the Court's decision
may have the anomalous consequence of ushering a foreign plaintiff into the
courts of the sister state. 145 For example, in those instances where a
foreign plaintiff brings an action against a state that has not waived immunity
in its own court, the only forum available to that plaintiff may be the courts
of the sister state.
The major impact of this decision, however, may arise froln attempts to
enforce rendered judgments. 146 Currently the plaintiff-respondent can collect on the judgment in California because Nevada holds sizable assets

holding, and I suspect that the Court has opened the door to avenues of liability
and interstate retaliation that will prove unsettling and upsetting for our federal
system.
Id. at 427 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
142. The use of implied consent has been advised against where a "more realistic rationale"
can be found since it is a "mere fiction" and may result in "numerous inconsistent decisions"
and a "shift of emphasis to a new due process test of fairness to the defendant." EHRENZWEIG,
supra note 61, at 112.
143. Justice Blackmun said that "the Court paints with a very broad brush, and I am troubled
by the implications of its holding." 440 U.S. at 427 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See notes 138-39
and accompanying text supra.
144. 440 U.S. at 443 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See note 146 infra.

145. Justice Rehnquist reasoned that "[d]espite the historical justification of federal courts as
neutral forums, now suits against unconsenting States by citizens of different States can only be
brought in the courts of other States." 440 U.S. at 442 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
146. Justice Rehnquist opined that "[t]his decision cannot help but induce some 'Balkaniza-

tion' in state relationships as States try to isolate assets from foreign judgments and generally
reduce their contacts with other jurisdictions." Id. at 443 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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there. 147 Even if Nevada withdrew all of its assets from California and
forced the plaintiff-respondent to seek enforcement in Nevada, Nevada
would still be required to enforce the California judgment pursuant to the
full faith and credit clause. 148 What would be the result, however, if
Nevada insulated its assets in its own state finds? Recent case law would
lead to the conclusion that although the United States Supreme Court would
have grounds for review, 149 the eleventh amendment would l)ar the Court
from forcing Nevada to make payments out of state funds. 150 Thus, the
redress Nevada v. Hall sought to provide for the respondent might be unobtainable.
If the Court had incorporated clearer guidelines for the appropriate treatment of actions brought against sovereign states, some of these concerns
would remain unresolved. On the other hand, such articulated judicial directions coupled with an invitation for Congress to address these concerns
would have served to lessen the negative impact of the decision. Congress
could enact legislation aimed at reducing uncertainty in interstate actions by
molding appropriate interstate compact agreements. These desirable measures 151 could provide uniformity of law and insure greater chance for recovery for individuals in neutral forums.
CONCLUSION

Based on Nevada v. Hall, a sovereign may be sued without its consent, by
a citizen of another state, in the courts of a sister sovereign. In its decision,
the United States Supreme Court departed from the tradition of absolute
sovereign immunity by limiting the extraterritorial effect of that doctrine.
This approach parallels changing policies in federal and international imrnu-

147. In its Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Nevada emphasized the availability of its assets in

California banks. Brief for Petitioner on Writ of Certiorari at 5, Nevada v. Hall, 436 U.S. 925
(1978).
148. See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
149. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
150. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 99 S. Ct. 1139 (1979) (reaffirmed Edelman; allowed prospective injunctive relief information to class members); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (suit
by private parties seeking to impose liability from public monies is barred by eleventh amendment, absent state's consent). But see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (attorney's fees
ordered to be paid out of public funds did not violate eleventh amendment since it was classed
as other penalties imposed to enforce a prospective injunction).
Since the Court has upheld prospective injunctions against government officials and has upheld penalties stemming from such injunctions to be paid from state monies, it is not impossible
that the Court will order the payment of a judgment such as in Nevada v. Hall to be made from
state funds. The gap between granting injunctive relief and monetary awards when states are
defendants may be closed in the near future.
151. The need for enactment was expressed earlier. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 61, at 17.
Indeed, recently some states on their own initiative have begun to limit or waive immunity in
their courts. In addition, the state legislatures have shown support for unification efforts made
by the Commission on Uniform Laws. See Jackson, supra note 58, at 17 n.69. Finally, it has
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nity. The majority holding that extraterritorial immunity is a common law
doctrine rather than a constitutional mandate enables Congress to enact a
national, unified approach to immunity. Further, by limiting the absolute
sovereign power of a state to within its own borders, Nevada v. Hall makes
reparation possible friom a defendant state that, under the outmoded doctrine of sovereign immunity, would have been insulated unjustly against
such a claim.
Rebecca Block

been observed that governmental operations have not been encumbered as governmental immunity has been constricted through legislation and case law. JACOBS, supra note 43, at 153.

